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LIBERALIZATION AND
DEMOCRATIZATION: THE FORUM AND
THE HEARTH IN THE ERA OF
COSMOPOLITAN POST-INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM
SOL PICCIOTTO*
I
INTRODUCTION
THE MISNOMER OF PRIVATIZATION
The processes described under the misleading term “privatization” have
been part of a major social restructuring in both the political and economic
spheres.  Most notably, widespread state failures have resulted in significant
changes in the form and functions of the state.  This reform encompasses not
only the collapse of state socialism, but also crises and radical reforms in devel-
oped capitalist states, including U.S. regulated corporatism, European-style so-
cial-democratic welfare states, and the developmental states of Japan and the
Asian “tigers.”  The causes of these changes have been equally diverse, involv-
ing a mixture of both political and economic factors.  Nevertheless, these proc-
esses have much in common, entailing a transition to post-industrial capitalism,
or what Manuel Castells has called the “Information Age.”1
The crisis of the state has been most evident in eastern Europe and the for-
mer Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which experienced a systemic social
crisis of both political autocracy and economic centralization.  Elsewhere, the
relationships between the political and economic aspects have been less explicit,
and thus the overall nature of the processes has been harder to grasp.  One
linking element has been the increased difficulty of legitimizing public expendi-
tures from general taxes—especially those paid by direct taxes on income.  This
problem applied not only to social and welfare spending, but also to public
funding of the renewal of infrastructure, in particular, expenses to keep pace
with emerging needs and technologies in areas such as transportation and tele-
communications.
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At the same time, political systems found it increasingly difficult to resolve
conflicting claims and demands in public services.  New mechanisms were de-
vised to decentralize decisionmaking and introduce “market principles” into
public sector resource allocation.  Although these changes were often presented
as a decentralization or devolution of power, this characterization was in many
respects misleading because the power devolved was generally limited to micro-
management of shrinking resources within the parameters defined from above.
I had first-hand experience of this process as an elected school governor from
1989 to 1991, not long after the British Conservative government had intro-
duced devolved budgetary management in schools.  That system was billed as a
transfer of power from local education authorities to head-teachers and gover-
nors.  In practice, it relieved our local authority of the responsibility for difficult
decisions, such as deciding whether to close small rural schools or balancing
staffing needs against book purchasing; however, central government essentially
determined the parameters for these decisions by setting the weighting criteria
for budgetary allocations to schools.  Similar attempts were made in other pub-
lic services, such as health care.
Thus, although there has been much political talk of “rolling back the state,”
the process has largely consisted of remodeling the “public” sphere of politics
and its relationship to the “private” sphere of economic activity.  This is shown
even by crude measures, such as state expenditure as a proportion of Gross
Domestic Product (“GDP”), which has scarcely fallen even in countries where
there has been extensive privatization.2  At the same time, major transforma-
tions have also been occurring in the forms of organization of so-called private
enterprise, that is, the business economy dominated by the giant corporation.
Large-scale mass manufacturing has been reorganized, and the centralized bu-
reaucratic firm has become the “lean and mean” corporation, concentrating on
its “core competencies” but operating within a web of strategic alliances, sup-
plier chains, and financial and governmental networks.3
Many of these changes have been driven by social pressures from below.
There have been widespread revolts against autocratic power in the family and
the factory, the classroom and the boardroom.  In general terms, these revolts
entail a rejection of authoritarian domination and the power to control truth
embodied in tradition, involving demands for increased personal freedom, dig-
nity, equality (notably between women and men), and an end to coercion.4
Rather than the desire for economic liberalization bringing about political de-
mocratization, the struggles against autocracy have created an opening for eco-
2. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING
WORLD 22 (1997).
3. BENNETT HARRISON, LEAN AND MEAN: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE
POWER IN THE AGE OF FLEXIBILITY (1994) (stressing that this transition has not been a matter of
small firm dynamism, but a reorganization of big business adapting to an era of rapid technological
change, shorter product life cycles, and specialized but globalized markets).
4. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS
RESHAPING OUR LIVES (2000).
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nomic liberalization.5  While undermining patriarchy and hierarchy, these anti-
authoritarian movements have also paved the way for post-industrial capitalism,
with its emphasis on information management, flexible working conditions, and
a global outlook.
These changes have undoubtedly been very liberating for those who, in
many ways, constitute a new global elite, but the benefits have been limited,
partial, and exclusionary.  Certainly, most people in Western Europe and North
America enjoy high living standards, and many in Asia and Latin America have
felt the benefits of development.  At the same time, an increased polarization
has occurred both within and between states.  The gap between rich and poor
states has continued to widen, and income inequality has increased even in de-
veloped countries; marginalization, poverty, and social exclusion affect both the
underclass in developed countries and wide regions of underdevelopment, es-
pecially in Africa.6  Also, many of those who have benefited materially have
nevertheless experienced greater insecurity and alienation, and the disintegra-
tion of traditional social bonds has led to new assertions of identity—sometimes
destructive ones—based on ethnic or cultural exclusivity.
II
GLOBALIZATION AND REGULATION
Privatization and liberalization have been part of a broader process now
generally referred to as globalization.  They have entailed the transfer of many
sectors of economic activity out of state ownership, the dismantling of direct
forms of state control, and the removal of barriers to market access both within
and between states, greatly facilitating the potential for the flow of goods and
capital.  Although this transformation is often called deregulation, it has also
been widely recognized that there has, in practice, been a growth of new forms
of regulation, or re-regulation.7  Indeed, national regulatory reforms have often
facilitated the globalization of markets,8 and the process of re-regulation has in
many cases entailed a complex interaction between national and international,
5. Political studies have found that domestic factors have had the strongest influence in demo-
cratic transitions, although the international context plays an important part through processes of
emulation and influence.  See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRATIZATION:
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS (Laurence Whitehead ed., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS].  However, as Philippe Schmitter indicates, the transmission belt for democratization has
been the international communication outside government controls of images and ideas, rather than a
simple causal link of economic freedom stimulating political democratization.  See Philippe Schmitter,
The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-
Democracies, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra, at 26-56.  Schmitter also points out that the hy-
pothesis that economic freedom leads to political democracy is an inversion of Kant’s assumption that
republics would be more likely to engage in international commerce and renounce war.  See
IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE (1795) (cited in Schmitter supra).
6. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: END OF MILLENNIUM 70-165 (1998).
7. See DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION: REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990).
8. See Alfred Aman, A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reform: Rejection, Relocation,
or Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429-64 (1995).
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as well as public and private sector, initiatives.9  Although there is a continuing
neo-liberal ideological and institutional momentum to remove all national bar-
riers to market access for goods, services, and capital, there has been a greater
emphasis since the mid-1990s on the phasing of liberalization and the need for it
to be accompanied by improvements in national state regulation.10  Much less
attention has been given to improving the institutions of global governance,11
which is at least of equal importance.
The question of remodeling the global public sphere is generally approached
as a technical rather than a political matter.  This is reflected in the use of the
two key terms—“regulation” and “governance.”  The concept of regulation can
be understood as the capacity of the social system to adapt and stabilize in re-
sponse to politico-economic dynamics (as in the French “regulation school”); or
more particularly, regulation may refer to explicit, legally formalized mecha-
nisms for directing or supervising economic activities.  In many ways it has been
paralleled by the term “governance,” which seems to have been introduced into
the parlance of the so-called Washington consensus by World Bank officials,
constrained by the World Bank’s constitution from intervening in the domestic
political affairs of states, who found it a useful euphemism in raising issues such
as corruption.12  The term “governance” also reflected a technicist view of social
management that had a wider resonance.  Thus, among some theorists of politi-
cal science and public administration, it has been used to analyze changing pat-
terns of state-market coordination, which can be more decentralized and inter-
active, responding to social complexity and failures of government or political
control.13
9. The best example is financial services.  For further details, see Sol Picciotto & Jason Haines,
Regulating Global Financial Markets, 26 J.L. & SOC’Y 351 (1999).
10. This movement was signaled by the World Bank.  See WORLD BANK, supra note 2, at 75
(stressing the importance of reinvigorating state capacity, conceding that the shift in the 1980s to the
minimalist state “overreached many states’ institutional capabilities,” and urging that “[e]very country
must also look to build and adapt its institutions, not dismantle them”).  This viewpoint was renewed
following the Asian crises.  See Joseph Stiglitz, More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Towards
the Post-Washington Consensus, 1998 WIDER Lecture Before the U.N. University-World Institute for
Development Economics Research, Helsinki (Jan. 7, 1998) (visited Oct. 4, 2000) <http://www.world
bank.org/html/extdr/extme/js-010798/wider.htm>.  For a discussion of this shift in relation to legal insti-
tutions, see Lawrence Tshuma, The Political Economy of the World Bank’s Legal Framework for De-
velopment, 8 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 75 (1999); GOOD GOVERNMENT AND LAW: LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Julio Faundez ed., 1997).
11. This was addressed in the report of the Commission on Global Governance but has had rela-
tively little resonance.  See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL
NEIGHBOURHOOD (1995).
12. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS
(forthcoming 2001).  The World Bank was also influenced to take greater account of the role of the
state by the success of the East Asian “developmental states.”  See Robert Wade, Japan, The World
Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective, 217 NEW
LEFT REV. 3, 3-36 (1996).
13. See MODERN GOVERNANCE: NEW GOVERNMENT-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS (Jan Kooiman
ed., 1993).  Renate Mayntz, using a systems-theory perspective, traces the term back to German de-
bates on “soziale Steuerung,” when it was used as an equivalent for the Parsonian concept of control (as
in control hierarchy); however, this meaning obscured the distinction between governing (the inten-
tional application of measures to achieve goals) and governance (which recognizes that social subsys-
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The use of these terms is both descriptive and normative.  They reflect real
historical developments, with the transformation of large-scale industrial pro-
duction and centralized planning systems (both state and corporate) leading to
the emergence of more flexible and interactive modes of production and distri-
bution based on electronic technologies, as well as major changes in money and
finance involving new forms of market intermediation of savings and invest-
ment.  At the same time, these concepts are often used to legitimize the in-
creasingly important role of a variety of professionals operating in the increas-
ingly large interface between the state—which has been substantially
“privatized”—and the market—which is dominated by corporate networks.
Not surprisingly, each group tends to give its own ideological spin to the terms:
policy-makers and lawyers advocate deliberately designed governing mecha-
nisms and formalized regulation, while economists emphasize the self-governing
capacities of market-based systems.14
Thus, one important aspect of globalization has been the process of frag-
mentation of the public sphere, reflecting shifts in the character and relation-
ships of private and public institutions and resulting in systems of layered gov-
ernance based on regulation.15 A number of writers have described this
fragmentation in terms of the emergence of regulatory webs or networks, al-
though they offer different analyses of the phenomenon and its implications dif-
fer in various ways.  Susan Strange has analyzed the emergence of networks of
power in the international political economy.16  Anne-Marie Slaughter refers to
the “disaggregation” of the state, and the development of international regula-
tory cooperation through inter-governmental networks.17  John Braithwaite and
Peter Drahos have conducted an impressive survey and analysis of the role of
global regulatory webs in the globalization of business.18  Writers on the Euro-
pean Union increasingly conceptualize it in terms of transnational regulatory
networks,19 and Manuel Castells describes the European Union as the Network
tems have autonomous capacities to develop and will react and adapt to governing measures).  See Re-
nate Mayntz, Governing Failures and the Problem of Governability: Some Comments on a Theoretical
Paradigm, in MODERN GOVERNANCE, supra, at 9.
14. See generally REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985).
15. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., REGULATORY CO-OPERATION
FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (1994) (visited Oct. 4, 2000) (Executive Summary available at
<http://oecd.org/puma/regref/coopern.htm>); see also Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Eco-
nomic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
1014 (1996-97).
16. See Susan Strange, Who Governs? Networks of Power in World Society, 1994 HITOTSUBASHI
J.L. & POL. 5; see also SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS (2d ed. 1988).
17. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at
183, 184, 195.
18. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
19. See, e.g., Renaud Dehousse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of
European Agencies, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 246, 246-61 (1997).  Giandomenico Majone sees it as part of a
more general phenomenon of delegation of public functions or powers to specialist and often technical
bodies.  See REGULATING EUROPE: EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1996).
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State, while he asserts that networks are the prime characteristic of the emerg-
ing social structures of the “Information Age.”20
Some political and international relations theorists, who have identified the
important role of these international regulatory networks, have put forward
analyses theorizing them as an essentially technocratic infrastructure or a dele-
gation of administrative powers.21  They consider that specialists or experts
merely facilitate the normal channels of government and international relations
by dealing with detailed and essentially technical tasks, thus making it easier for
the traditional democratic government structures to resolve the more general
and important political issues.  Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas argued that the
“epistemic communities” of experts sharing a common set of values can facili-
tate the resolution of global policy issues by “narrowing the range within which
political bargains could be struck.”22  As an example, they cited the way in which
the core of the Bretton Woods monetary system—fixed rates and the dollar-
gold standard—was agreed to by expert consensus, leaving a narrower range of
issues, such as the extent of balance-of-payments support, to be “resolved
purely through political muscle.”23  However, the insider memoirs of Raymond
Mikesell give a very different and more plausible flavor of those negotiations,
showing that the “experts” of that period (1943 to 1945) were highly political
individuals such as Harry White, and that key matters, such as the proposed
IMF quotas, were calculated on the basis of political acceptability, although put
forward as objective and scientific in order to facilitate acceptance.24
These propositions suggest that the growth of international regulatory or
governance networks does not constitute the reduction of the scope of inter-
state politics, but rather its pursuit by other means.25  Certainly, it may entail an
attempt to “depoliticize” issues, by deploying scientific, managerial, or profes-
sional techniques and basing their solution on universalizing discourses.  How-
ever, such techniques are neither neutral in themselves, nor in the processes of
their development and application.  To operate effectively, they must interact
with intersecting epistemologies within a process that can also reflect wider
public concerns, to produce socially acceptable value judgments.  That specific
technical issues cannot easily be isolated from wider cultural, social, and politi-
cal factors is borne out by the frequently divergent views and disagreements on
decisions between experts or specialists from different national and cultural
20. For a discussion of networks, see MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: THE RISE OF
THE NETWORK SOCIETY (1996) [hereinafter CASTELLS, NETWORK SOCIETY]; for Europe, see
CASTELLS, MILLENNIUM, supra note 6.
21. See generally REGULATING EUROPE, supra note 19; Slaughter, supra note 17.
22. Emanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the
Creation of a Reflective Research Programme, 46 INT’L ORG. 367, 378 (1992).
23. Id.
24. See generally RAYMOND FRECH MIKESELL, THE BRETTON WOODS DEBATES: A MEMOIR
(1994).
25. See Yves Dezalay, Between the State, Law and the Market: The Social and Professional Stakes in
the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 59 (William Bratton et al. eds., 1996).
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backgrounds.  While international bureaucracies still prefer to represent their
role as a technocratic one, they apparently have begun to accept—perhaps in
response to criticism—that it has a political dimension, at least in terms of the
concern that their policies should be acceptable to the public.26
Thus, while there is an important role for specialist expertise in regulatory
decisionmaking, it is important that it should be exercised within a framework
that is accountable and responsive.  This includes direct democratic account-
ability because the powers of regulators have important social effects—even if
they are narrow in scope.  For example, central bankers set short-term interest
rates, utility regulators have power over pricing or service obligations, and sci-
entists set the allowable catch from a fishery.  Much of the discussion of regula-
tion starts from the mistaken assumption that it is an external imposition on
markets, only justified in cases of market failure, and limited to market facilita-
tion rather than redistribution.27  These assumptions underpin the view that
market-facilitative regulation can and should be guided purely by efficiency
considerations and can therefore be done technocratically, because only deci-
sions involving redistribution (or the allocation of scarce resources) entail social
value judgments and thus political legitimization.  In fact, a market economy
cannot exist without norms of many kinds, from technical standards to semi-
formal regulation to formal legal rules.  These are the norms that create and de-
fine property rights, the institutions and structures of production and distribu-
tion, and the conditions of competition.28  They therefore have a major impact
on livelihoods and health and living standards, and their legitimacy depends on
wide social acceptability.  The importance and complexity of such forms of
regulation has increased in post-industrial, globalized capitalism, which has led
to pressure for new forms of democratization of the accountability of formal
regulatory rule-making even at the national level.  This regulation is not a
merely technical matter, but must be done as a process of open interaction with
a wide public, subject to checks on the exercise of private influence.
Thus, the fragmentation of the public sphere and the emergence of new pat-
terns of governance entail a rethinking of accountability or legitimacy.  In this
perspective, the problem of globalization does not simply result from disjunc-
tures between nationally organized political systems and increasingly globally
oriented economic activity or even power structures.  It stems, rather, from
changes in the form and functions of the state itself, as well as its international
structures, resulting from the dynamic of socio-economic relations.  What glob-
alization means, and the shape it might take, are as much political as economic
26. See, e.g., Christine Landfried, Beyond Technocratic Governance: The Case of Biotechnology,
EUR. L.J. 255 (1997) (discussing the European Commission).  For a discussion of the changes in meth-
ods of operation of global economic institutions in response to political pressures, see Robert O’Brien,
NGOs, Global Civil Society, and Global Economic Regulation, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS: BEYOND LIBERALIZATION 257 (Sol Picciotto & Ruth Mayne eds., 1999).
27. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982).
28. See generally David Campbell & Sol Picciotto, Exploring the Interaction between Law and Eco-
nomics: The Limits of Formalism, 18 LEGAL STUD. 249 (1998).
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questions.  A new global public sphere has been under construction for some
time, but it has come from the policies and decisions of international elites.  The
question now is whether and how it can be democratized.
III
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: NEO-KANTIAN MODELS
The challenge is to find new democratic forms that match the new, globally
integrated patterns of production and consumption.  While there is much talk of
the “democratic deficit” of regional and international institutions, debate about
how it might be remedied is at best half-hearted, or even skeptical.29  This skep-
ticism can be readily understood if we continue to think in terms of a simple
electoral representative model of democracy.  No one seriously envisages the
possibility of a global government on this model, and indeed, the greater
awareness of the importance of locality and diversity resulting from economic
globalization renders it even less believable.
This dilemma can be seen in much of the discussion of the prospects and
proposals for “cosmopolitan democracy.”  This debate recognizes that global-
ization, based on the neo-liberal vision of the removal of barriers and the un-
leashing of the forces of economic self-interest, is at best unstable if it cannot
deliver social justice.  Global social justice issues, moreover, must be debated
and resolved within a global public sphere.30  However, there is too little under-
standing or analysis of the nature of this global public sphere.  It is frequently
said to entail the emergence of some sort of global or international civil society.
Yet there is considerable vagueness about who are the members of such a
global civil society; in the perspective of international relations, they are seen in
an undifferentiated way as non-state actors, as opposed to states (meaning gov-
ernments), which are the traditional members of international society.  Cer-
tainly, the more sophisticated theorists concede that “the spatial reach of the
modern nation-state did not fix impermeable borders for other networks” and
that “political communities have rarelyif everexisted in isolation as
bounded geographical totalities, and they are better conceptualized as overlap-
ping networks of interaction.”31  Indeed, one can go further and point out that
territorially defined states themselves have always formed overlapping and in-
terlocking spheres, as the exercise of state powers was mediated through the
flexible concept of jurisdiction.  Thus, the classical liberal international state
system of Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith was already composed of interde-
29. Robert A. Dahl argues that international organizations are, and can only be, bureaucratic bar-
gaining systems among elites.  This conclusion flows from his view that the problem of delegation, al-
ready great for national representative systems, becomes insuperable for international politics.  See
Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S
EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999).
30. See generally Richard Devetak & Richard Higgott, Justice Unbound? Globalization, States and
the Transformation of the Social Bond, 75 INT’L AFF. 483, 483-98 (1999).
31. DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO
COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 225 (1995).
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pendent states, and the growth of corporate industrial capitalism has, since the
second half of the nineteenth century, depended on international arrangements,
many of which (such as the system of intellectual property) resulted from the
debates and pressures of “international civil society.”32
Those who seek a foundation of legitimacy for global economic liberaliza-
tion tend simply to resort to prescriptions for universal rights and principles of
justice.33  This entails no revision of the dominant existing model of representa-
tive democracy based on the nation-state but seeks to ensure its adoption in all
states, which should be bound together within a strong framework of interna-
tional law and institutions embodying individual human rights.  In this perspec-
tive “equal rights of the citizens may offer the most effective strategy for com-
pensating the ‘democratic deficit’ of international organizations.”34  This would
actualize Kant’s vision of “Perpetual Peace,” based on a confederation or
league of republican states, which would renounce war and pursue reciprocal
economic benefits through trade, under an umbrella of principles embodying
individual cosmopolitan rights.35
This ultra-liberal view assumes that the pursuit of individual self-interest,
especially through economic exchange, is ultimately beneficial to all, so that the
development of principles embodying individual rights, and the adjudication of
conflicting rights-claims, would be sufficient to ensure universal consent and le-
gitimacy.  This would therefore justify even the entrenchment of internationally
agreed principles so as to override national parliamentary supremacy, to secure
the “effective judicial protection of the transnational exercise of individual
rights.”36  Many, even lawyers, will be skeptical of the faith this places in general
liberal principles of law.  Democracy is far more than the rule of law, which can
at best provide a framework for adjudicating competing claims of right.  Politi-
cal processes must decide who should have what rights.  This was seen, for ex-
ample, in the debates around the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment (“MAI”), which was criticized on the grounds that it would grant strongly
enforceable rights for corporations and investors without any concomitant re-
sponsibilities and impose disciplines on states without strengthening state regu-
latory capacity.37
Others have put forward somewhat modified, neo-Kantian models, which
accept the need for a strengthening of the international institutional framework
to provide an underpinning for “cosmopolitan democratic public law.”  But
32. For a more detailed analysis, see CRAIG N. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
INDUSTRIAL CHANGE: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE SINCE 1850 (1994); Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory
Criss-Cross: Interaction between Jurisdictions and the Construction of Global Regulatory Networks, in
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION, supra note 25, at 89.
33. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy
for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 28 (1998).
34. Id.
35. See generally KANT, supra note 5.
36. Petersmann, supra note 33, at 26.
37. See generally REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 26.
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what seems to be envisaged does not appear very different from what I have de-
scribed as the ultra-liberal model, somewhat reinforced by improving the repre-
sentativeness of regional and international organizations.38  There are clear con-
tradictions and limits to the neo-Kantian models.39  A new approach should
begin by more adequately taking into account the ways in which the new forms
of global socio-economic integration, the changed nature of the state, and the
fragmentation of the public sphere entail new modes of accountabilityand
hence new democratic formsat all levels.
Essentially, without a democratization of the global public sphere, a radical
liberal vision of cosmopolitan citizenship and universal individual rights lacks
any substantial democratic content.
IV
DIRECT DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
The discussion of the limits of neo-Kantian models for democratizing glob-
alism points to the need for new concepts and forms of democratic accountabil-
ity that are responsive to the fragmentation of the public sphere and the more
dispersed, decentralized, and multi-layered forms of regulating the exercise of
social power.  Indeed, this process of fragmentation results from the limits and
contradictions of previous, state-centralized forms and also stimulates new
forms of legitimation.  The very decentralization of decisionmaking provides
opportunities for accountability, because power is less concentrated.  To that
extent, it is accurate to see a connection between liberalization and increased
liberty, and even accountability.  The dispersal of decisionmakers provides
automatic checks and balances, because a decision by one committee or regula-
tor is rarely definitive.  The much greater opportunities for strategic behavior
and regulatory arbitrage generate regulatory competition.  Decentralization has
the potential for ratcheting standards up, as well as down.  Although this tends
to favor those with greater opportunities for mobility, and to destabilize and
thus downgrade existing, socially-embedded regulatory arrangements and ca-
pacities, it also opens up prospects for strategic actions by new types of citizen
groups and social organizations.40  This effect helps to explain the mushrooming
growth of issue-oriented social movements broadly described as Non-
Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”).
38. This appears to be the argument of David Held.  See HELD, supra note 31, at 255; see also
David Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: A New Agenda, in PERPETUAL PEACE
235, 235-51 (James Bohman & Mathias Lutz-Bachman eds., 1997).
39. These are explored by the contributors to PERPETUAL PEACE, supra note 38, although they are
generally concerned for various reasons to rescue what can be salvaged rather than to look for a new
approach.  As the editors of the collection point out in their introduction, “Escaping the dilemmas of
despotism and fragmentation remains the most difficult institutional challenge of a cosmopolitan order;
showing how the public use of reason permits both unity and difference is a task that the Kantian con-
ception of reason has yet to solve.”  Id. at 18.
40. For a detailed analysis with many examples and practical suggestions, see BRAITHWAITE &
DRAHOS, supra note 18.
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However, the constitution of democracy requires the formulation of princi-
ples adapted to the emerging forms of the new public sphere, but which explic-
itly aim to structure that democracy to ensure the most effective forms of
popular participation.  The dangers of liberalization and globalization are that
they unleash socially destructive behavior based on the competitive pursuit of
self-interest, as existing normative and institutional restraints are undermined
or dismantled.  Who can genuinely be surprised when full-blooded liberaliza-
tion results in widespread corruption and the rapid growth of organized crime,
as has occurred, for example, in Russia?41
Thus, new democratic constitutional principles should foster active delibera-
tion by citizens, based on the articulation and evaluation of generally applicable
values in a variety of public forums and institutions.  The most helpful and rele-
vant approaches emerge from the work of political theorists arguing for new
forms of direct democracy based on deliberative principles and aiming to con-
tain or counterbalance instrumental rationality by fostering public debate and
decisionmaking through communicative interaction and reasoning.42  They at-
tempt to respond to the challenge posed to both liberal and republican (or
communitarian) democracy by social fragmentation, which generates a politics
of identity, often based on the view that differences are unassimilable.43
These proposals do not reject representative government; in fact they re-
spond to the ways in which it has been transformed.  Bernard Manin has com-
prehensively and convincingly analyzed these transformations, with the pro-
gressive breakdown of party democracy, in which parliaments became a register
of the relative force of clashing interests that governments aimed to resolve by
compromises.44  He charts the rise of a new form of representation, in a context
of greater complexity and unpredictability.  He sees the electorate now as ap-
pearing “above all, as a public which responds to the terms that have been pre-
sented on the political stage,” while politicians offer a choice among images
which are “highly simplified and schematic political representations.”45
Opinions on specific issues are no longer pre-formed or defined by group
political identities and hence must be formulated and developed through debate
in various public forums (although such debate is dominated by communica-
tions media that are less partisan, but more prone to drama and sensational-
41. See Gregor Yavlinsky, Russia’s Phony Capitalism, 77 FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1998, at 67, 68-
71.
42. See generally JOHN S. DRYZEK, DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY (1990).  Although this approach
owes much to Jürgen Habermas, I think it can avoid his unhelpful separation between the “lifeworld”
and that of technical and instrumental rationality, as well as the need to establish ideal, uncoerced
communicative contexts.  The social structures of power, including communication, should be seen in a
more dialectical way, and the changes in the structure of the public sphere open up possibilities—many
of which Habermas himself recognizes—for reconstituting a more effective democracy.  This, in turn,
can counteract inequalities of power.
43. See DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL
(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
44. See Bernard Manin, The Metamorphoses of Representative Government, 23 ECON. & SOC’Y
133, 160 (1994).
45. Id.
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ism).  This analysis again indicates the importance of ensuring that government
takes place within a broader framework of debate and decisionmaking that is
open to the active involvement of issue groups and concerned citizens.  In the
final section of this paper, I suggest in outline the basic principles for constitut-
ing the public sphere in the spirit of active, deliberative, democratic participa-
tion, combined with some practical suggestions indicating their particular rele-
vance to globalization.
V
FOUR CONSTITUTIVE PRINCIPLES FOR DEMOCRATIZING GLOBALISM
New forms of active citizenship and political action have been developing,
often around the local and national impact of regional or global policies.  The
recognition that the public sphere has become fragmented into multiple inter-
secting networks and overlapping jurisdictional spheres emphasizes the impor-
tance of building democratic participation through new political principles, in-
stitutions, and practices.  These emerging institutions should recognise the
diversity of political sites in which public policies are developed and imple-
mented through processes of interaction between these sites.
Such principles must attempt to transcend the two main traditional constitu-
tional models, which are increasingly proving inadequate for the contemporary
phase of globalization.  On the one hand, liberal conceptions, based on a view
of society as composed of individuals pursuing their own self-interest, see the
role of the polity as complementing the market and as aiming to identify the op-
timal collective interest—either by authoritarian means (Hobbes46) or via ma-
joritarian representative democracy (Locke47). Post-industrial capitalism, with
its integrated global production and marketing networks, raises a wide range of
social, environmental, and moral issues that cannot adequately be resolved by
aggregating private interests, using either authoritarian or democratic methods.
The alternative model of civic republicanism, on the other hand, rejects the nar-
row view of citizenship based on weighing and balancing competing individual
interests.  Its stress on an ethical politics based on visions of the common good,
however, implies a communitarianism requiring shared values.  In today’s cul-
turally fractured world, this takes reactionary forms and may generate conflict
rather than consensus.
As Jürgen Habermas has suggested, whereas both these views tend to see
the state as the center, deliberative politics can be adapted to a decentered soci-
ety:
This concept of democracy no longer needs to operate with the notion of a social
whole centered in the state and imagined as a goal-oriented subject writ large.  Just as
little does it represent the whole in a system of constitutional norms mechanically
46. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Alexander Lindsay ed., Dutton 1950) (1651).
47. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas Peardon ed., Lib-
eral Arts Press 1952) (1690).
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regulating the interplay of powers and interests in accordance with the market
model.48
Others also have stressed the attractiveness of a direct, deliberative form of par-
ticipatory democracy for solving problems in ways unavailable to representative
systems:
Collective decisions are made through public deliberation in arenas open to citizens
who use public services, or who are otherwise regulated by public decisions.  But in
deciding, those citizens must examine their own choices in the light of the relevant de-
liberations and experiences of others facing similar problems in comparable jurisdic-
tions or subdivisions of government.49
According to this perspective, decisionmaking, especially by public bodies,
should result as far as possible from active democratic participation based on
discursive or deliberative, rather than instrumental, reasoning.  Instead of the
pursuit of individual interests based on the assumption of fixed preferences, the
aim is to go beyond an objectivist rationality (in which choices are considered to
be made by reference to absolute and objective standards), without falling into
the trap of relativism.50  Thus, while accepting that there is no single objective
standard of truth, because perspectives are always subjective (and hence epis-
temology is to that extent relativist), truth can be said to be an emergent prop-
erty of the deliberative interaction between perspectives (and hence its ontol-
ogy is objective).
Deliberative democracy accepts the existence of a diversity of perspectives
and aims to facilitate interactive deliberation about values through which pref-
48. Jurgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE,
supra note 43, at 27.  Habermas nevertheless argues that his own concept of a “politically socialising
communicative context” can be translated from the nation-state to the European sphere, which entails
building “a European-wide, integrated public sphere . . . in the ambit of a common political culture.”
Jurgen Habermas, Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s “Does Europe Need a Constitution?,”  1 EUR. L.J. 303,
306 (1995).  Others have put forward neo-republican models for a “multi-level” European citizenship.
See Richard Bellamy & Alex Warleigh, From an Ethics of Integration to an Ethics of Participation: Citi-
zenship and the Future of the European Union, 27 MILLENNIUM 447 (1998) (implying that the republi-
can version of participatory democracy can be translated to the European level (although this is con-
tested by Habermas)).  It seems important, however, to accept that even Europe, which has a strong
institutional base and some elements of a common political culture, does not form an integrated politi-
cal unit, and hence that democratic forms need significant adaptation.  It is clear, for example, that the
European Parliament must play a different role from that of national parliaments, and hence it must be
differently organized, just as national parliaments must adapt to deal with the Europeanization of the
legislative process.  This is perhaps the practical political response to the debate about the “European
demos.”  See Peter Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranation-
alism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 675 (1999).
49. Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313, 314 (1997).
Oliver Gerstenberg introduces the work of Cohen and Sabel into the debate on democracy in the
European Union by pointing out how this vision opens up the argument that supra-nationalism can it-
self be the focus of this type of radical democracy.  This is because it goes beyond existing forms of con-
stitutional democracy bounded by market-state-civil society and shows that new forms of governance
based on deliberative coordination are not conventionally public or private, pointing to a new division
of labour between political agencies and directly deliberative problem-solving units.  See Oliver Ger-
stenberg, Law’s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel, 3 EUR. L.J. 343 (1997); see also Christian
Joerges & Jurgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The
Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 EUR. L.J. 273 (1997).
50. See generally DRYZEK, supra note 42.
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erences may change, or may be accommodated to each other.  An emphasis on
process may help to overcome the weaknesses of this model if it is conceived as
a political ideal or as relying on the generation of consensus purely through the
public use of reason.  Crucially, account must also be taken of inequalities of
power, which generate conflicting interests, as well as imbalances in the capacity
to participate in a politics based on reasoning.
To this end, constitutional principles should aim as far as possible to protect
the public sphere from the instrumental pursuit of private interests.  Clearly,
subjectivity resulting from each person’s experiences, background, and aspira-
tions is inevitable, but this should be reflexively acknowledged so that individu-
als and groups maintain openness to the arguments of others.  Above all, public
arenas should be insulated from undue influence from private interests, and de-
bate should be conducted in terms of explicitly articulated values and aims.
This objective is fundamental to the four general principles that I would put
forward as constitutive of a direct-democratic, deliberative public sphere: trans-
parency, accountability, responsibility, and empowerment.  I will briefly discuss
each of these in turn, although in practice, they are interdependent.
A. Transparency
Economic liberalization and globalization have led to the increasing articu-
lation of the requirement of transparency, but until recently it generally has
been directed at national governments, aiming to reduce bureaucratic obstacles
to market transactions.  Thus, many provisions in the WTO agreements require
transparency of national regulatory and administrative procedures.  This is be-
cause it is believed that regulatory measures, policies, and proposals adopted by
one state may, in the context of increased global economic integration, act as
obstacles to market access by firms in other states.  Thus, the WTO agreements
include obligations not only for accessible publication of national regulations,
but also for the establishment of national contact points to provide information
(including translations of relevant texts) and even for prior notification of pro-
posals for non-standard regulations with an opportunity to make comments.51
51. Notably, Article 7 and Annex B of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures requires states to notify each other in advance of any proposals for regulations that
are not based on an international standard, to “allow reasonable time for other Members to make
comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take the comments and the results of
the discussions into account”; developed countries must provide translations of documents in English,
French or Spanish.  See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994)
[“WTO Agreement”], art. 7, annex B, FINAL ACT—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Apr. 15,
1994, vol. 27; 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).  The agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which requires
states to base their technical regulations on international standards where they exist except where they
would be “an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pur-
sued,” focuses on transparency of conformity assessment procedures (article 10), including the re-
quirement for inquiry points which can provide documents at reasonable cost (and for developed coun-
tries, in English, French, or Spanish).  See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, supra, Annex 1A, FINAL ACT, supra, vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).  The TRIPS
agreement (article 63) also includes obligations to publish and notify laws, regulations, final judicial
rulings, and administrative rulings of general application.  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
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However, there are virtually no formal provisions regarding transparency of
international bodies and arenas.  Indeed, intergovernmental negotiations and
activities are especially opaque, and both politicians and officials generally
stress the importance of confidentiality in this realm, which is often excluded
from national freedom of information requirements.  In the European Union, it
was only as a result of the legitimacy crisis, recognized in the negotiation of the
Maastricht treaty, that E.U. institutions began to adopt principles of transpar-
ency.52  This was finally formally recognized in the Treaty of Amsterdam signed
in June 1997.  Additionally, Article 255 of the consolidated Treaty establishing
the European Community now gives any E.U. citizen or resident a right of ac-
cess to documents of the Council, Commission, and Parliament, subject to
“[g]eneral principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest,” to be
drawn up by the Council.53
This provision is exceptional, perhaps even unique, in an international
treaty, but should be regarded as a constitutive principle for all international
bodies, and indeed any serious international regulatory activity.  Nevertheless,
such a principle will inevitably remain ineffective if subject to broad exceptions
and if the general rules and individual decisions on what can be revealed are left
to each body to decide for itself.54  Effectiveness could perhaps be improved by
the establishment of Ombudsmen, as has also been done in the European Un-
Intellectual Property Protection, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra, Annex 1C, FINAL ACT, supra,
vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994).
52. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY] Declaration No. 17 (stating that “transparency
of the decisionmaking process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public’s
confidence in the administration,” and recommending that the Commission submit a report to the
Council by 1993 on measures to improve public access to information).  This resulted in the approval by
the Council and Commission on December 6, 1993, of a Code of Conduct, which stated the general
principle that “the public will have the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission
and the Council,” but which also required the institutions to refuse access to any document whose dis-
closure would undermine “the protection of the public interest (public security, international relations,
monetary stability, court proceedings and investigations)” and permitted them to refuse access “in or-
der to protect the institution’s interest in the confidentiality of its proceedings.”  1993 O.J. (L 340) 41.
Journalists, Members of the European Parliament, and activists have waged several battles to try to en-
sure that these exclusions are interpreted strictly, with some support from the European Court of Jus-
tice.  See generally TONY BUNYAN, SECRECY, DEMOCRACY AND THE THIRD PILLAR (1999); see also
Case T-14/98, Hautala v. Council, [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 528 (Ct. First Instance 1999).  Typically, this case
concerned the Council’s refusal to supply a report on the criteria for arms exports, on the ground that
disclosure could be harmful to the European Union’s relations with third countries, and although the
Court annulled the decision, it did so only because the Council had not considered whether the report
could be published with sensitive parts removed.
53. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 16 (1997) [hereinafter
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM].
54. Thus, the initial proposals emerging from discussions of officials of E.U. institutions for imple-
mentation of TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 53, art. 255, apparently suggested that only docu-
ments concerning legislative measures would be regarded as “accessible,” while internal “working
documents” would be “non-accessible,” and even the former might be embargoed until after the formal
adoption of the decision.  See 9 STATEWATCH (1999).  Such a proposal is hardly likely to gain approval,
but that it was made at all is revealing of the official perspective.
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ion,55 to monitor the transparency of international bodies, and to investigate or
adjudicate claims of confidentiality.  The principle of transparency is just as im-
portant for apparently technical bodies, as has been pointed out by Willem
Buiter in a trenchant critique of the traditionalist approach adopted by the
European Central Bank, which he describes as “typical of a central banking
tradition that was, until very recently, dominant across the world, which views
central banking as a sacred, quasi-mystical vocation, a cult whose priests per-
form the holy sacraments far from the prying eyes of the non-initiates.”56
Transparency has now been facilitated greatly by the opportunities opened
up by the Internet.  Indeed, some international bodies have begun to make ex-
tensive use of this medium to make their documentation available.  It is obvi-
ously very advantageous for an organization such as the WTO to be able to give
such instant online access to its large and growing documents archive to all
those in its 132 member countries who require it.  The Internet also offers pos-
sibilities for much more interactive consultation of relevant communities by the
public, and some organizations are beginning to make use of this.  In practice,
however, there are very great inequalities in the capacity to access the Inter-
net,57 so that to realize the opportunities it offers also requires active programs
to broaden effective participation by all affected and concerned citizens.
Finally, perhaps the key requirement is to develop and sustain information
media that can help to provide the kind of forum that active public participation
in deliberative debate requires. Universal public distrust of politicians, equaled
only by its cynicism about journalists, is a serious indictment of our political sys-
tems.  There are certainly some media organizations in some countries, as well
as many able and committed individuals, dedicated to providing a rich context
of information and to facilitating debate.  However, the media overall, in some
countries more than others, are subservient to government agendas and com-
mercial imperatives58 and hence tend to reflect received or elite opinion.  Ac-
cordingly, a key requirement for transparency in the public sphere is to ensure
guarantees of media independence from both government and private domi-
nance.  News media, in particular, should be owned neither by governments nor
tycoons, but by journalist collectives or trustees.
55. Carsten Grunbeck-Jensen provides an interesting evaluation from a Scandinavian perspective,
particularly apposite since these countries have been influential in the moves toward transparency in
the European Union, but he points out that the E.U. Ombudsman has no real teeth, having no better
access to documents than the citizen.  See generally Carsten Grunbeck-Jensen, The Scandinavian Tra-
dition of Open Government and the European Union: Problems of Compatibility?, 5 J. EUR. PUB.
POL’Y 185 (1998).
56. Willem H. Buiter, Alice in Euroland, 37 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 181, 198 (1999).
57. See Saskia Sassen, Digital Networks and Power, in SPACES OF CULTURE 49 (Mike Feather-
stone & Scott Lash eds., 1999); see also Access to the Network Society: Who is in the Loop and on the
Map?, U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 61-66 (1999).
58. See Symposium, The Power of the Media in the Global System, 47 J. INT’L AFF. 1 (1993).
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B. Accountability
The past few years have seen increasing concern and debate about the ac-
countability of all kinds of participants in public policy debates.  Even in coun-
tries with apparently well-established systems of representative democracy,
politicians have been subjected to new scrutiny over their acceptance of bribes,
political donations, or campaign financing, as well as debates about the relation-
ship of their personal lives and morality to their public functions.  That such is-
sues have been very widespread, not confined to countries undergoing identifi-
able political transitions (such as Italy, with its “tangentopoli” scandals linked
to the collapse of the Christian Democracy-Communist duopoly), shows that
they are symptomatic of generalized changes in the role of elected politicians,
indicated in Bernard Manin’s analysis of the changing nature of representative
democracy.59
The increased diversity and complexity of policy issues, and the decline of
mass-party politics, places new responsibilities on politicians to develop spe-
cialist expertise and resources and to manage their information sources scru-
pulously.  They themselves are also increasingly concerned with their respon-
siveness to public opinion, whether expressed in their mail (and e-mails),
opinion polls, or focus groups.  However, the increased importance of personal
charisma or name recognition for the standing of politicians, as opposed to pol-
icy or principles, has undermined their legitimacy as political representatives.
For a variety of reasons, it has become increasingly plain that democratic
accountability of public bodies cannot rest only on their accountability via par-
liaments and elected politicians.  Indeed, some kinds of decisions (such as con-
trol over interest rates) have been transferred out of the political domain to
protect them from short-run electoral considerations.  An increasingly wide
range of matters has been delegated to specialist bodies operating under de-
fined mandates, with powers of either recommendation or actual decision.
Where there is a governmental input, it is generally made by non-elected offi-
cials who are subject to only superficial supervision by a succession of partially-
briefed elected politicians.  Often, issues are not resolved by a decision from
one particular body but are subject to interacting decisionmaking powers of
various bodies at the national level, and even more so at the global level.
Thus, for example, the development and use of biotechnology depends on
decisions by patent offices, scientific and ethical committees, food and drug
regulators, national governments, and perhaps ultimately WTO dispute-
settlement procedures.  It is important not only that all such public bodies oper-
ate under explicit and specific accountability mandates, but also that their deci-
sions are taken in a context of well-informed debate involving as broad a range
of the public as possible.  The channels of accountability are now less vertical,
leading into central government, and more horizontal, entailing interaction be-
tween various local, national, regional, and international public arenas.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
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Thus, while elected politicians certainly should play an important, and per-
haps determinative part, ensuring accountability within the public sphere entails
the involvement of a wide range of entities and groups, all of which have their
own constituencies and accountability mechanisms.  This is perhaps the reason
for the increased use in recent years of the somewhat amorphous term “civil so-
ciety.”  The point here is that there is no single accountability mechanism to the
broad public.  Participants in public debate can make different contributions,
but it is incumbent on each of them to clarify to whom and how they are ac-
countable.  Indeed, there have been increasing pressures for all kinds of organi-
zations to improve their accountability, not only to their direct members, but to
a wider constituency of stakeholders.
Corporations have also come under pressure to be responsive to the needs
and demands of their customers, suppliers, workers, and contractors, as well as
local communities and the wider society, with respect to some of their activities.
Their traditional focus on the bottom line of direct costs and revenues to gener-
ate shareholder value has now been overtaken by the need for a more continu-
ous two-way dialogue with this wider constituency and concern for the “triple”
bottom line and long-term values, such as reputation.  Many business managers
need to be convinced that this entails more than just improved communication
of decisions made in their boardrooms.  It is no coincidence, however, that the
lead is being taken by companies that have been hit by unexpected public reac-
tions to policies that they believed had the legitimacy of approval by all relevant
regulatory bodies.  This has been shown, for example, by Shell’s experiences
over the Brent Spar oil platform disposal and the impact of its oilfields on local
communities in eastern Nigeria,60 as well as the experiences of biotechnology
companies in relation to genetically modified organisms.61  The damage to inves-
tor confidence in the biotechnology sector should bring home to all concerned
the importance of improving public confidence in regulatory decisions.
In reply, many have challenged the various campaigning organizations and
NGOs to justify their claims that they represent public opinion.  Such organiza-
tions cover a wide gamut and clearly do have a responsibility to clarify for
whom they speak, as well as to maintain an active dialogue with their members
and stakeholders.  They also are vulnerable to bottom-line pressures from their
sources of funding, which may lead them to adopt high-profile campaigns or
maintain positions for their attractiveness to the media rather than their intrin-
sic validity.  There may be differences of perspective between different ele-
ments of their constituencies, such as a divergence of belief between subscribers
and contributors in developed countries and those in less developed countries
who are the intended beneficiaries of development organizations.  Interest-
group institutions, such as business and trade associations and trade union or-
ganizations, in principle represent their members and can claim accountability
60. See Nick Mayhew, Trouble with the Triple Bottom Line, FIN. TIMES , Aug. 10, 1998, at 10.
61. See Jane Martinson, Monsanto Pressured to Sell Off GM Assets, GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 1999, at
1.
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ultimately via election certainly at the international level; however, this may be
a distant link.  There is much they could do to improve the active involvement
of their grass-roots memberships.
In summary, the roles of various kinds of participants should be defined ac-
cording to the contribution they can make to public debate based on generally
applicable values.  Procedures for consultation and involvement in decision-
making should reflect their particular roles, as well as accommodating and safe-
guarding against possible distortions resulting from advancement of private in-
terests.
C. Responsibility
Participants in public deliberation may also be said to have obligations of re-
sponsibility that are distinct from their accountability to their particular con-
stituencies.62  These include principles for maintaining a separation between in-
volvement with private interests and the conduct of public duties and activities,
as well as norms and practices of responsible behaviour developed by and for
particular groups and professions.  The acceptability and effectiveness of public
policy decisions increasingly depend on the quality of the reasons supporting
them, which in turn requires all those involved in debates to uphold high stan-
dards of probity.  This is evidenced by the increased attention being given to
ethical standards by and for a wide range of groups and professions, many of
which have been formally articulated in codes or even in law.
An important aspect of this change is to define and police the line between
professional or public responsibilities and obligations to a commercial client or
employer.  Thus, banks and financial intermediaries are now obliged to report
suspicious transactions under money-laundering legislation, enacted nationally
but stimulated and monitored by the international regulatory network centred
on the Financial Action Task Force.63  External auditors may have specific re-
sponsibilities to report to regulatory authorities, for example to banking super-
visors, if they uncover breaches of regulatory requirements.  Officials or civil
servants may be protected from disciplinary or even legal proceedings for
breaches of confidence if they can show that they acted in the public interest.
However, too often, the formal rules on these matters are not designed to en-
courage or protect disclosures in the public interest, but rather to protect public
or private bureaucracies from undesirable obligations or revelations.  The
62. This, of course, depends on who is included in that constituency.  See generally JONATHAN P.
CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE
COUNTRIES (1994).  For example, it is argued that potential conflicts between corporations’ duties to
their shareholders and to their stakeholders should be avoided by limiting their accountability to share-
holders, while accepting that they have broader social responsibilities.  See id.  I prefer here to use the
term responsibility in relation to how debate should be conducted.
63. This is a typical informal global regulatory body, set up by a decision of the Group of Seven,
but located at the Organisation for Economic Development (“OECD”) in Paris.  See Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering (visited Oct. 4, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/fatf>.
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strengthening of these bureaucracies should be regarded as a significant contri-
bution toward the democratization of global governance.
More broadly, all those involved as information gatekeepers or knowledge
producers, now more than ever, need to operate reflexively, with an awareness
of what impact their professional or scientific practices and contributions have
on the quality of public debate.  These matters are not uncontroversial, as can
be seen in the debates about the criteria applied in peer-review for publication
of studies on controversial technologies, such as genetically-modified organ-
isms, or whether there should be an obligation to publish results from all phar-
maceutical drug evaluations.
D. Empowerment
My final principle should be regarded as an overriding one, because without
it, the other proposals for strengthening the public sphere as a deliberative
arena would do little more than provide an alibi for the maintenance and exten-
sion of the system of elite decisionmaking.  It is all too easy for those with deci-
sionmaking power to pay lip-service to the need for public consultation or par-
ticipation, although one can still be surprised at the frequency with which they
neglect even this bare minimum.  It is often only as a result of a policy setback,
such as the breakdown of the MAI negotiations, that those in power resort to a
“charm offensive” to try to win support from potential critics.  Frequently, also,
they prefer to distinguish carefully between procedures for consultation with
public interest or activist groups and their discussions with business or corpo-
rate interests.  This inevitably raises suspicions that decisionmakers are more
open to influence from private interest groups, and that they regard consulta-
tion with public interest-groups and concerned citizens (or even legislators) as
an irritating time-waster, perhaps necessary to forestall subsequent criticism.  It
is all too rare to find an acknowledgement that the quality of public decisions
can be improved if they take place in a context of full participation by all con-
cerned and affected groups.
The challenge, therefore, is to find ways to ensure effective participation in
debate and decisionmaking, especially of disadvantaged citizens and groups.
Much of the political opposition to, and disaffection with, globalization and lib-
eralization results from the unleashing of forces that exacerbate inequalities
within and between states often portrayed as a battle between the global market
and the national state. This view tends to neglect the ways in which the trans-
formation of the world market is being brought about by complex processes of
international re-regulation.  A key example is the restructuring of global tele-
communications, in which giant firms battle for market shares, entailing strug-
gles over technical standards, sectoral regulation (notably governing intercon-
nection rights and charges), and competition rules through interactions between
a variety of national and international bodies.  A key issue, which has for sev-
eral years been preoccupying the International Telecommunications Union
(“ITU”), is the system of settlements with respect to international calls, which
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entails revenue-sharing resulting in transfers, mainly from developed to devel-
oping countries, estimated at seven to ten billion dollars per year.64  There is
considerable pressure to reform this system in order to end discrimination in
charges between international and national calls, consistent with the liberaliza-
tion of telecommunications services negotiated bilaterally, regionally (especially
in the European Union), and through the WTO.  Yet it is also widely recog-
nized that a truly global telecommunications system is unattainable unless
equivalent (or better) means are found to finance the expansion and upgrading
of telecommunications networks in developing countries.65
Global battles over regulation also concern revenue distribution and redis-
tribution, not just “neutral” rules that allow markets to operate “freely.”  Many
other debates and battles over international regulatory arrangements also have
(re)distributional consequences or implications, running often to many millions
or billions of dollars, such as competition laws and policies, environmental pro-
tection schemes, intellectual property rights, food safety requirements, agricul-
tural support and rural development measures, prudential rules for financial in-
stitutions, and international tax arrangements.  Too often, the talk of “market
friendly” regulation implies rules that favor the economically powerful, whereas
balanced and sustainable long-term economic growth may require measures to
protect, encourage, and stimulate less developed or disadvantaged groups, re-
gions, and countries.  For example, the international patent system ensures that
billions of dollars are channeled into research and development for new phar-
maceutical drugs.  Inevitably, however, the vast bulk of this is aimed at com-
bating health problems of the affluent.66  It has proved extremely difficult for
the World Health Organization to negotiate collaborative arrangements for the
development of new drugs to combat tropical diseases such as malaria, which
would be of immense benefit on a global level;67 yet drug companies would
fiercely resist the proposal made by Médecins sans Frontières to fund such ini-
tiatives through a tax on drug sales.
An important function of direct democracy is to open up the received wis-
dom of closed bureaucratic or technocratic decisionmakers to critical and de-
stabilizing ideas.  Perhaps this cannot be institutionalized without blunting the
64. See Dr. Henry Chasia, Opening Remarks to the Annual Council of the Commonwealth Tele-
communication Organization (Sept. 29, 1998).  These remarks and other documentation on the issue
are available in the special area of the ITU website.  See International Telecommunication Union (vis-
ited Oct. 9, 2000)  <http://www.itu.int/itudoc/osg/colloq/chai_rep/sevencol/sevencol.html>.
65. See the comprehensive report by Michael Tyler, Transforming Economic Relationships in In-
ternational Telecommunications (1997) for ITU Regulatory Colloquium No. 7, on The Changing Role
of Government in an Era of Telecommunications Deregulation (visited Sept. 23, 2000) <http://www.itu.
int/itudoc/osg/colloq/chai_rep/sevencol/sevencol.html>.
66. Research done for Médecins sans Frontières shows that of 1233 drugs licensed worldwide be-
tween 1975 and 1997, only 13 were for tropical diseases, of which two were slight modifications of ex-
isting drugs, two developed for the U.S. military, and five were the outcome of veterinary research.  See
Bernard Pecoul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries—A Lost Battle?, 281 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 361; see also David Pilling, In Sickness and in Wealth, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1999, at 23.
67. See The Multilateral Initiative on Malaria (visited Oct. 9, 2000)  <http://www.malaria.org/MIM.
html>.
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critical edge of political protest, although sometimes well-considered and sub-
stantiated arguments take second place to spectacular actions designed to at-
tract media attention.  Responsive and confident political systems can find ways
to make themselves more open to external critical input.  For example, public
forums or commissions could be empowered to conduct inquisitions into poli-
cies or issues or specific decisions could be delegated to citizen juries, based on
systematic presentation and examination of evidence.
VI
CONCLUSION
It is difficult not to close an article of this kind without some stirring rhetoric
about the importance of this matter for the future of the planet in the new mil-
lennium.  Major issues are certainly at stake, but their scope and complexity are
hard to grasp in full.  Globalization seems to produce scandals, panics, and
crashes, which we can hope will remain episodic events.  However, not only sys-
temic stability is at stake in the construction of global governance, but also our
ability to establish the conditions for economic activity that will finally respond
to the needs of the world’s poor and dispossessed for dignity and social justice.
